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Articles

Rethinking Student Cell Phone Searches
Marc C. McAllister*
ABSTRACT

In Fourth Amendment analysis, warrants are often required to
search for evidence of criminal wrongdoing. However, under the searchincident-to-arrest warrant exception, once an individual has been placed
under custodial arrest, certain warrantless searches may follow, such as a
search for weapons or evidence possibly within the arrestee's reach. In
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the proposed extension of the search-incident-toarrest exception to cell phones, thereby requiring a warrant to search a
phone's digital contents. Although Riley recognized that arrestees have
reduced expectations of privacy, the privacy concerns in a cell phone's
digital data were simply too great to allow such data to be searched
without judicial approval.
This article examines Riley's impact on searches of K-12 and
college students' cell phones as an incident to a violation of law or
school rule, and proposes heightened Fourth Amendment protections in
both contexts. First, this article argues that although college students
enjoy reduced Fourth Amendment protections when campus safety and
* Marc McAllister teaches courses and writes on topics involving criminal law and
procedure. His articles have been published in respected journals such as the Cincinnati
Law Review, Florida State Law Review, Hofstra Law Review, Seattle Law Review, and
Case Western Reserve Law Review.
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educational concerns predominate, those concerns do not apply to a cell
phone's digital contents. Unlike a weapon hidden in a student's dorm
room, a cell phone's digital data cannot harm anyone, and routinely
inspecting such devices would not enhance the educational environment.
Accordingly, this article contends that the cell phones of college students
deserve the full protections of a warrant and probable cause, as in Riley.
For K-12 students, this article proposes a solution that accounts for the
unique privacy concerns in cell phones while simultaneously preserving
the school system's need for freedom from judicial supervision. Thus,
this article proposes that schools adopt an internal system of checks and
balances marked by independent review of a school official's desire to
search a student cell phone and documented reasons for performing the
search.
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INTRODUCTION

Although just fifty-four words in length, the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution has spawned a vast array of case law and
academic commentary.
Not only is Fourth Amendment law

1.

The Fourth Amendment provides:

2016]

RETHINKING STUDENT CELL PHONE SEARCHES

311

voluminous, it is also context-specific. 2 As such, Fourth Amendment
protections vary based on a variety of factors, including the level of
intrusiveness of a particular investigative technique, the suspect's status,
the location of the search, and the manner of investigation. Thus, a
custodial arrest requires a greater degree of suspicion than does a
suspect's brief detention;3 K-12 students enjoy less Fourth Amendment
protection than adult citizens; 4 searches conducted at the border require
less suspicion of wrongdoing than searches outside the home;5 and a
suspect's location may be determined, without judicial approval, via cell
tower records, but may not be obtained without a warrant through a GPS
device that police attach to the same suspect's vehicle.6 In the Fourth
Amendment, context matters.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. The Supreme Court has recognized the context-specific nature of the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) ("Although the
underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be
reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes
place.").
3. Compare New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990) (noting the "long ...
settled" rule that "a warrantless arrest in a public place [i]s permissible as long as the
arresting officer had probable cause"), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)
(authorizing a brief, temporary seizure of a person suspected of committing a crime on
the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause).
4. Under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), adult citizens enjoy full
Fourth Amendment protection in their closed containers, which require either a warrant
or an applicable warrant exception to search. In the K-12 context, warrantless searches of
lockers, purses, backpacks, cars, and clothing have all been upheld as reasonable based
on a mere "reasonable suspicion" that the student at issue had violated either the law or
school rules. See Bernard James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and Smart
Devices After Riley v. California, 101 IOWA L. REv. 343, 350 (2015) (citing cases).
5. Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that the use
of trained narcotics detection dogs at an international airport is not a Fourth Amendment
"search," effectively allowing the investigative technique to be used without a warrant or
probable cause), with Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013) (deeming use
of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a suspect's home a Fourth Amendment
"search," effectively requiring probable cause and a warrant, or some applicable warrant
exception).
6. See Marc McAllister, GPS and Cell Phone Tracking: A Constitutional and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 82 U. CN. L. REv. 207, 221-29 (2013) (comparing cases).
7. See Cornfield by Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316,
1320-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing various types of school searches and recognizing
that "whether a search is 'reasonable' in the constitutional sense will vary according to
the context of the search").
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In Riley v. California,8 the United States Supreme Court sought to
determine the precise Fourth Amendment protection owed an arrestee's
cell phone. The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to obtain a
warrant to search for evidence of criminal wrongdoing.9 However, under
the warrant requirement's "search incident to arrest" exception, certain
warrantless searches may occur once an individual has been placed under
custodial arrest, such as a search for weapons or destructible evidence
that may be within the arrestee's reach at the time of arrest.'o As long as
the arrest is based on probable cause," the resulting search for weapons
and destructible evidence requires no independent suspicion.12 Riley
rejected application of this exception to cell phones found on arrestees,
even though they could contain destructible evidence, and made clear
that the substantial privacy interests inherent in the digital contents of a
cell phone far outweigh the otherwise limited privacy rights enjoyed by
arrestees.
This article examines Riley's impact on searches of the digital
contents of K-12 and college students' 1 4 cell phones as an incident to a
violation of law or school policy.15 As of today, Riley requires probable
cause and a warrant to search a cell phone's digital contents as an
incident to an arrest,1 6 but neither safeguard is required to conduct the
same search as an incident to a K-12 student's suspected violation of law

8. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
9. Id. at 2482.
10. See People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (N.Y. 1923).
11. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990).
12. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("A custodial arrest of
a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment;
that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search,
and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
'reasonable' search under that Amendment."). When police conduct a warrantless search
incident to arrest, they may search not only "the arrestee's person," but also "the area

from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." See
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009).
13. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485-91 (discussing the privacy concerns inherent in
modem cell phones as compared to the privacy concerns at issue in more traditional
searches of purely physical evidence); see also id. at 2488 (discussing the reduced
expectations of privacy resulting from arrest).
14.
In this article, the author collectively refers to both college and university
students by use of the single term, "college students."

15. As used in this article, the term "cell phone" refers to the modern "smartphone"
capable of sending text messages, taking photographs, accessing the Internet, and storing
large amounts of data, among other functions. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480, 2482 (noting

that such phones were "unheard of ten years ago," but today "a significant majority of
American adults now own such phones").

16.

Id. at 2485.
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18
or school policy.1 7 Thus, Riley and K-12 precedents are in tension,
particularly in those instances where K-12 students are arrested on school
grounds in possession of a cell phone.' 9 The law is somewhat less clear
in regards to college student cell phone searches. However, as with K- 12
students, courts have recognized reduced Fourth Amendment protections
for college students as well.20
After weighing the pros and cons of extending Riley to the
schoolhouse gates, this article arrives at the simple conclusion that,
despite its narrow holding, Riley's sweeping pronouncements regarding
the unique privacy concerns inherent in the modern cell phone demand
reconsideration of the law governing cell phone searches of K-12 and
college students. Riley stated, for example, that searches of cell phones
are far more invasive than searches of the person and his effects, and thus
disallowed warrantless searches of cell phones under circumstances that
permit searches of the person and his effects. 2 ' More importantly, Riley
declared that the privacy protections owed modern cell phones are even
greater than what we enjoy in our homes, the area that has traditionally
received the most Fourth Amendment protection,22 thereby implying that
cell phone searches--of any kind and in any place-are owed the

See infra Part III.A.
17.
Other commentators have noted the tension between Riley and the K-12
18.
precedents. See, e.g., James, supra note 4, at 344 (recognizing that because "Riley
categorically makes the warrantless seizure and harvesting of the digital contents of smart

devices unlawful absent additional justification by police,

...

[i]n education law, Riley

sits uncomfortably alongside New Jersey v. T.L. 0.").

19. Cf Mabry v. Lee Cty., No. 1:13-CV-00214, 2016 WL 952102, at *4 (N.D.
Miss. Mar. 9, 2016) (discussing the intersection between the Supreme Court's K-12 strip
search case, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009), which
found a student strip search to violate the Fourth Amendment, and Florence v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012), which permitted
suspicionless strip searches of all arrestees committed to a detention facility's general
population).
20.
See infra Part III.B.
place vast quantities of
According to the Court in Riley, "[c]ell phones ...
21.
personal information literally in the hands of individuals. A search of the information on

a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search [of an arrestee
and his possessions] considered in Robinson. We therefore decline to extend Robinson to
searches of data on cell phones, and hold instead that officers must generally secure a
warrant before conducting such a search." Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.

22.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the heightened

Fourth Amendment protections in the home. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.

573, 585 (1980) (recognizing that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.
With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable
and hence constitutional must be answered no.") (internal citations and marks omitted).
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Finally, although Riley

involved searches of arrestees, who have traditionally enjoyed
"diminished privacy interests," the Court nevertheless imposed the
protections of probable cause and a warrant due to the countervailing
privacy concerns in cell phones, notwithstanding arrestees' diminished
expectations of privacy. 24 This approach can be applied to K-12 and
college students as well, who, like arrestees, have also enjoyed
diminished privacy interests and reduced Fourth Amendment protections
and who, like adult arrestees, typically house a substantial amount of
private information within their phones.
Although there are strong arguments for extending Riley to searches
of K-12 and college students' cell phones, there are also powerful
arguments for refusing to do so, particularly with respect to K-12
students, whose freedoms are necessarily curtailed due to the level of
supervision required in public schools. After weighing the competing
concerns, this article proposes heightened Fourth Amendment
requirements in both contexts. With respect to K-12 students, this article
advocates a slight change to existing law that would account for the
unique privacy interests in cell phones while simultaneously preserving
the educational system's ability to control the learning environment
without undue judicial supervision. To achieve the necessary balance,
this article recommends that schools adopt an internal system of checks
and balances requiring a higher-level, independent review of a school
official's desire to search a student cell phone, along with an
administrative warrant that a head school official must sign before a
student's cell phone may be searched.
Regarding college students, this article argues that although college
students enjoy reduced expectations of privacy in certain instances,
particularly in the realm of administrative inspections of college living
quarters, the campus safety concerns that underlie such rulings do not
apply to a cell phone's digital contents. Unlike a weapon that may be
hidden in a student's dorm room, a cell phone's digital data cannot harm
anyone. Moreover, unlike administrative sweeps of dorm rooms for
health and safety purposes, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where
college student cell phones could be reasonably "inspected" for a similar
administrative purpose. For these reasons, this article argues that college
students should be afforded the same protections in their cell phones
23. The Court in Riley declared that "a cell phone search would typically expose to
the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house." Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2491. This is because, according to the Court in Riley, "[a] phone not only contains in
digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad
array of private information never found in a home in any form." Id.
24. Id. at 2488.
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enjoyed by the adult arrestees in Riley, namely the full protections of a
warrant and probable cause.
Before examining Riley's impact on student cell phone searches,
Part II of this article outlines the search incident to arrest exception and
its underlying rationale. Part III summarizes the leading K-12 Fourth
Amendment cases, their theoretical underpinnings, and lower court cases
involving searches of K-12 student cell phones. Part IV examines
searches of college students' cell phones and outlines the unique privacy
rights college students enjoy. Part V examines Riley's impact on K-12
and college cell phone search law, considering arguments for and against
extending Riley to those cases. Part VI concludes.
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION

II.

For several hundred years, the law has recognized that a search of
an arrestee's person and the immediately surrounding area into which he
might reach to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence is permissible as an
incident of the arrest, and thus may be conducted without a search
warrant.25 The justification for allowing this type of search is two-fold:
ensuring officer safety as the suspect is taken into custody, and
preventing the accused from destroying evidence that may be within his
reach at the time of arrest.26
As with any warrant exception, identifying the underlying
justification for the exception is critical, not only for understanding why
the exception exists, but also because the justification itself determines
how the warrantless search may unfold. 27 As a general Fourth
Amendment principle, warrantless searches must not only be reasonable

25. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (recognizing in dictum
"the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American
law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the
fruits or evidences of crime"); People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (N.Y. 1923)
(recognizing, based on centuries of precedent, that a "[s]earch of the person becomes
lawful when grounds for arrest and accusation have been discovered, and the law is in the

act of subjecting the body of the accused to its physical dominion."); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 764 (1994)
(recognizing that the right to conduct a warrantless search incident to arrest dates back
centuries).

26.

See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 232 (1973). Regarding the officer

safety rationale, writing in 1923, Justice Cardozo noted, "[t]he peace officer empowered
to arrest must be empowered to disarm," adding that "[i]f he may disarm, he may search
[the arrestee's person], lest a weapon be concealed." Id. (quoting Chiagles, 142 N.E. at

584).
27.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1968) (recognizing that "[t]he scope of [a

warrantless] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible.").
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in their inception, they must also be reasonable in scope.28 In the
particular context of a search incident to arrest, the lawful arrest itself
triggers the right to search the arrestee for weapons or destructible
evidence, thereby justifying the warrantless search. 29 The scope of that
search, including exactly where the arresting officer may search for
weapons or destructible evidence, in turn depends on the likelihood an
arrestee could access the area the officer seeks to search. 3 0 Accordingly,
when considering the extent of a government official's search and
seizure powers under a particular warrant exception-not only in the
arrest context but also in the K-12 and college environments-it is
critical to understand the exception's underlying rationale.
A.

Search Incident to Arrest Exception Applied to the Home and to
Vehicles

For the past several decades, the Supreme Court has struggled to
define the precise scope of a permissible warrantless search incident to
arrest. 3 1 In Chimel v. California,32 a 1969 search incident to arrest case,

28. See id. at 28-29 ("The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted
is . . as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all. The Fourth
Amendment proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of governmental action as
by imposing preconditions upon its initiation."). The Supreme Court has consistently
acknowledged the scope of search principles set forth in cases like Terry v. Ohio and the
K-12 search cases. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139-140 (1990) (discussing
cases recognizing that a warrantless search must be circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation).
29. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
30. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (1978). See also id. at 341-43
(recognizing that the justifications underlying the search incident to arrest exception
"authorize[] police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when
the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time of the search"). Scope of search principles also include a time element. Thus,
once the circumstances that justify the warrantless search terminate, the search itself must
terminate. A warrantless search justified by an exigency, for example, is no longer
permissible once the exigency has ended. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
388-94 (1978) (finding that for the exigency in the case, "the need to look for injured
persons" defined the scope of the permissible warrantless search and also demarcated its
end point, such that once the exigency had ended, the right to search without a warrant
ended as well); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297-300 (1967) (in a case of hot
pursuit where police followed a robbery suspect into a particular home, finding that the
exigent circumstances warrant exception applied such that the particular exigency-hot
pursuit of an armed robber-both justified the warrantless entry into the home and
defined the defined the scope of the permissible warrantless search that followed; as such,
the officers had the right to search any place in the home where the armed robber, his
weapons, or anyone else who might interfere with the arrest could be found, but their
right to search without a warrant ended once the exigency ended).
31. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482-83 (2014).
32. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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the Court explicitly tied the scope of the search to its underlying
justifications, which illustrates the modem approach to such cases.
In Chimel, police arrested a man inside his home and as an incident
to his arrest-i.e., without a search warrant-conducted a search of his
entire three-bedroom house.3 3 During their nearly hour-long search,
officers opened drawers and inspected their contents, discovering
numerous incriminating items later used to prosecute and convict the
arrestee.34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case to resolve
"whether the warrantless search of the [arrestee's] entire house can be
constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest." 3 5 Tying the scope of
the permissible warrantless search to its underlying justification, the
Court declared that "[a] search . .. incident to a lawful arrest [is] a
strictly limited right [that] grows out of the inherent necessities of the
situation at the time of the arrest." 3 6 Thus, the Court held that although it
is reasonable to search the actual "area into which an arrestee might
37
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items," it is not
reasonable to expand the scope of that warrantless search to encompass
"any room other than that in which an arrest occurs" or "the desk
drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself." 3 8 Rather,
"[s]uch searches ... may be made only under the authority of a search
warrant [or applicable warrant exception]."
Over the next forty years, the Court decided a variety of cases
applying Chimel to searches of recent car occupants who had been
placed under arrest, as well as the vehicles from which they had recently
departed. New York v. Belton4 0 and Arizona v. Gant1 are the two most
notable cases in this area, which together reinforce the notion that
warrants may be dispensed with only when the justifications for the
warrant exception at issue apply.
In Belton, a New York police officer pulled over a car for excessive
speeding. There were four men in the car, including defendant Belton.
After pulling over the vehicle, the officer smelled marijuana and
observed drug paraphernalia. At this time, the officer directed the men to
exit the car, and placed them under arrest. The officer then searched the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 753-54.
See id. at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id at 759 (quoting Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948)).
Id at 763.
Id.
Id.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
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four men, as well as the passenger compartment of the car where he
found a jacket that contained cocaine.42
Before trial, Belton unsuccessfully moved to suppress the cocaine
as the product of an unlawful search. On appeal, the Supreme Court
sought to determine whether it was proper to search the interior of the
automobile as an "incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants." 43
Setting forth what police later understood to be an automatic right to
search a vehicle's passenger compartment under these circumstances, 44
the Court declared that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile," 45 as well as any containers found therein.46 As a result, the
Court upheld the search of the vehicle and jacket at issue.47
Belton's automatic right to search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle as an incident to the arrest of one of its occupants rested on the
"generalization," endorsed by the Belton Court, "that articles inside the
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary ite[m]."48
Over the next thirty years, courts and
commentators questioned the validity of this "generalization" and the
resulting rule allowing warrantless vehicle searches even in cases where
the passenger compartment is not actually within the arrestee's reach at
the time of the search, which turned out to be common, as in the case of a
suspect securely detained in a police car when the search is conducted.49
42. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56.
43. See id. at 459.
44. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 349 (noting that, prior to 2009, police viewed the Belton
search rule as "an entitlement"); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (describing Belton as "a bright-line rule for arrests of automobile
occupants, holding that, because the vehicle's entire passenger compartment is 'in fact
generally, even if not inevitably,' within the arrestee's immediate control, a search of the
whole compartment is justified in every case").
45. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. In a footnote, the majority declared that its holding was
consistent with Chimel, as its ruling simply defined the scope of the "grabbing area" as it
relates to a lawfully arrested recent car occupant. See id. at 460 n.3.
46. See id at 460. The Court deemed containers found within the passenger
compartment immediately searchable as well because, according to the Court, "if the
passenger compartment is within reach of the [typical] arrestee, so also will containers in
it be within reach." Id The Court further declared that such containers may be searched
"whether ... open or closed." Id. at 461. See also id. at 460 n.4 (defining the term
"container").
47. See id. at 462-63.
48. See id. at 460.
49. See, e.g., Thornton, 541 U.S. at 628-29 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the
"reported cases involving this precise factual scenario-a motorist handcuffed and
secured in the back of a squad car when the search takes place-are legion," and
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The holes in Belton's logic eventually became the basis for
overruling its automatic right to search and more strictly adhering to
Chimel's officer safety and evidence preservation rationales, which
occurred in 2009 in Gant.s0 In Gant, police knew that Gant's driver's
license had been suspended, for which there was a warrant for his arrest,
and observed him pull into the driveway of a home they were
investigating. Gant parked and exited his car, shut the door, and began to
walk toward the home. One of the officers then approached Gant,
meeting him about ten to twelve feet from his car, and arrested him for
51
driving with a suspended license.
After securing Gant in the back of a patrol car, police then searched
Gant's vehicle and discovered a gun and cocaine inside, which Gant
unsuccessfully sought to suppress. The Supreme Court later granted
52
certiorari to resolve whether Belton authorized the warrantless search.
Overruling Belton's automatic right to search the passenger compartment
of a vehicle as an incident to a vehicle occupant's arrest, the Court ruled
that the exception permits a warrantless search of a suspect's vehicle
"only when the arrestee is [actually] unsecured and within reaching53
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search."
Otherwise, the Court declared, such warrantless searches would be
allowed even where an arrestee, such as Gant, is not truly within
reaching distance of his car at the time of the search.5 4 Simply stated,
"[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that
law enforcement officers seek to search, both [Chimel] justifications for
concluding that "[i]f it was ever true that the passenger compartment is 'in fact generally,
even if not inevitably,' within the arrestee's immediate control at the time of the search, it
certainly is not true today").
50. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009) ("The experience of the 28 years
since we decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad
reading of that decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger
compartment are rarely 'within the area into which an arrestee might reach,' and blind
adherence to Belton's faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional
searches. The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us to approve routine
constitutional violations.").
51. See id. at 335-36.
52. See id. at 341.
53. Id at 343. In a separate section of the opinion, "[a]lthough it does not follow
from Chimel," the Court expanded the right to search in this instance to circumstances
where it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found
in the vehicle." Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
According to Justice Scalia, who advocated for the adoption of this standard in Thornton,
a search on this basis is reasonable because "[t]he fact of prior lawful arrest distinguishes
the arrestee from society at large, and distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime
from general rummaging," and "it is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime is
most likely to be found where the suspect was apprehended." Thornton, 541 U.S. at 630
(Scalia, J., concurring).
54. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.
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the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not
apply."55
Decided five years before Riley, Gant is significant in its
affirmation of the principle that warrants may be dispensed with only
when the justifications for the warrant exception at issue apply, at which
point the governmental interests in dispensing with a warrant are fully in
play, a principle that should be carried forward to K-12 and college
student cell phone search cases. As noted, underlying the search incident
to arrest exception is the assumption that a custodial arrest provides the
arrestee an incentive to destroy evidence or use any available weapon to
resist arrest. This rationale, in turn, determines what police may search
for as an incident to arrest, defines where they may search, and
designates how long they may search. Whether digital evidence
contained within an arrestee's cell phone falls within the scope of such a
warrantless search became the issue in Riley. 56
B.

Search Incident to Arrest Exception Applied to Cell Phones: Riley
v. California

Riley is the most recent Supreme Court case involving the search
incident to arrest exception, and is perhaps the most significant for
purposes of determining the constitutional protections that apply to the
digital data contained within K-12 and college students' cell phones.
. In Riley, the Court considered "whether the police may, without a
warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an
individual who has been arrested." 57 In Riley's case, one of two cases
consolidated for appeal, Riley was stopped for driving with expired
registration tags.
Thereafter, officers learned that Riley's license had
been suspended, permitting them to impound the car. Another officer
then conducted a warrantless inventory search of the car and discovered
concealed firearms, prompting Riley's arrest on firearm possession
charges.59
After Riley was arrested, an officer searched him as an incident to
the arrest and discovered items associated with the "Bloods" street gang.

.

55. Id. at 339. Notably, the Court in Gant recognized that "[bjecause officers have
many means of ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in
which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access
to the arrestee's vehicle remains." Id. at 343 n.4.
56. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) ("These cases require us to
decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones. .
57. Id at 2480.
58. See id For brevity's sake, the facts of Riley's companion case are not
summarized here. For a summary of those facts, see id at 2480-82.
59. See id.
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He also seized a cell phone from Riley's pants pocket, searched its
contents, and discovered some words on the phone - presumably in text
messages or contacts list - preceded by "CK," a label he associated with
the term "Crip Killers," a slang term for members of the Bloods gang.
About two hours later, again acting without a warrant, another officer
examined the contents of Riley's phone for evidence of gang-related
activity.60 On the phone, the officer discovered videos in which men
standing in
yelled the moniker "Blood," along with photographs of Riley
61
front of a car that had been involved in a recent shooting. Riley was
then charged with various crimes associated with that earlier shooting,
including firing at an unoccupied vehicle, assault, and attempted
murder.62
Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence obtained from
63
his cell phone, arguing that those searches required a warrant. The trial
court denied Riley's motion and officers testified at. .trial about the
incriminating videos and photographs found on Riley's phone, some of
64
Riley was then convicted of all
which were admitted into evidence.
of fifteen years to life.in
sentence
enhanced
an
received
and
three counts
the conviction and
affirmed
prison.65 The California Court of Appeal
ruled that the digital contents of a cell phone found on an arrestee's
person may be searched without a warrant under the search incident to
arrest exception. After the California Supreme Court denied Riley's
petition for review, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
66
review the matter.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that smart phones
are only a few years old, and thus lack "precise guidance from the
67
founding era" as to whether they may be searched without a warrant.
For this reason, the Court applied the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness balancing test to determine the appropriate constitutional
protection,68 essentially the same test applied in the K-12 and college
student search cases. 6 9 This test, the Court noted, required it to assess
"on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
60. See id. at 2480-81.
61. Id. at 2481.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id. (describing the California court proceedings).
65. Id.
66. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482.
67. Id. at 2484.
68. See id.
69. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (explaining that "the
the
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all
search").
the
of
circumstances,
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individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."7 0
Examining the governmental interests at stake, the Court
acknowledged that the two risks identified in Chimel-harm to officers
and possible destruction of evidence-are not truly present when digital
data is searched. 71 First, the Court. found that digital data stored on a cell
phone cannot harm anyone, such that searching a cell phone's data
cannot be justified by safety concerns.72 Next, regarding Chimel's
evidence destruction rationale, the Court noted that "once law
enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer any
risk that the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data
from the phone," thereby making a warrantless search of the phone's
digital data unreasonable.7 3
On the other side of the scale, the Court examined the privacy
interests of arrestees. The Court acknowledged that arrestees enjoy
"diminished privacy interests," but declared that when "privacy-related
concerns are weighty enough," a search involving an arrestee may still
require a warrant.7 4 Examining the cell phone's unique privacy interests,
the Court distinguished a search of a cell phone's digital data from
searches of other personal items carried by arrestees, stating that
"[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far
beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a
purse."75 As such, although a search of physical items found on an
arrestee can be said to involve "no substantial additional intrusion on
privacy beyond the arrest itself," extending that reasoning to digital data
is unwarranted.7 6
Delving deeper into the unique privacy concerns inherent in a cell
phone's digital data, the Court declared that modem cell phones are
"minicomputers" capable of being used as a telephone, camera, video
player, rolodex, calendar, tape recorder, library, diary, album, television,
map, or newspaper. Cell phones also have "immense storage capacity,"
70. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
71. See id at 2484-85.
72. Id at 2485.
73. Id. at 2486. This is true, according to the Court, despite the possibility of
"remote wiping," which occurs when a third party erases a phone's stored data remotely.
The Court was also not troubled by the possibility of encryption, which is a security
feature that some modem cell phones use that renders a phone all but "unbreakable"
unless police know the password. According to the Court, no evidence suggests that
either problem is prevalent. Moreover, law enforcement already possess specific means
of responding to these threats. See id at 2486-87.
74. Id at 2488.
75. Id. at 2488-89 (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 2489.
77. See id
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typically allowing the user to store millions of pages of text, thousands of
8
pictures, or hundreds of videos.' Also, the Court noted that a cell phone
contains many distinct types of private information, such as prescriptions
and bank statements that collectively reveal a great deal more about an
79
According to the
individual's private life than any isolated record.
Court, "the sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and
descriptions," whereas "the same cannot be said of a photograph or two
80
of loved ones tucked into a wallet."
Next, the Court found it significant that the data on a cell phone
often dates back to its purchase, making it capable of conveying a rich
history of information.81 The data on a cell phone could, for example,
reveal a person's Internet search and browsing history over a lengthy
period of time.82 Likewise, cell phone data could show the user's precise
location at various moments in time, enabling police to reconstruct
83
Mobile application software, or
someone's movements in the past.
"apps," could also reveal a great deal of information about all aspects of
a person's life, such as political and religious affiliations, addictions, and
finances.84 Finally, the Court noted that the prevalence of remote data
storage, or "cloud computing," magnifies the privacy interests at stake,
as searching a cell phone may enable police to access additional files
stored in the cloud. According to the Court, this "would be like finding a
key in a suspect's pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to
8
unlock and search a house,, 1 which contradicts general Fourth
86
Amendment principles requiring individualized and targeted suspicion.
When all these distinct privacy concerns are added to the scale, the result
is that the privacy interests inherent in cell phone searches "dwarf" those
at issue in the ordinary search incident to arrest, even exceeding those of
the home.

78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 2490.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 2491.
86. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1252-56 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (reviewing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause of
their own
protecting against general searches and complaining that officers, by
admission, engaged in a "fishing expedition for evidence of unidentified criminal activity
committed by unspecified persons," which "was the very evil the Fourth Amendment was
intended to prevent").
87. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490-91 (declaring that "a cell phone search would
typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house"
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As it pertains to K-12 and college student cell phone searches, the
Riley Court's analysis is significant in four respects. First, although
Riley's holding is narrow, the majority of its opinion is devoted to
espousing the unique and pervasive privacy concerns inherent in the
modem cell phone. Through its summary of the types of private
information cell phones contain, the Court left no doubt that cell phones
enjoy unique Fourth Amendment protection. As such, despite its narrow
holding, Riley's broader pronouncements should not be disregarded
when considering cell phone searches of K- 12 and college students.
Second, to analyze the cell phone search at issue, which lacked any
founding era guidance, the Riley Court applied the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness balancing test and simply weighed the government's
interests against the privacy concerns at stake. This same test is often
applied in the K-12 and college student cases, and Riley strongly
indicates that cell phone searches in the K-12 and college contexts will
continue to be governed by a reasonableness analysis due to the same
lack of founding era guidance.
Third, although the Riley Court acknowledged that arrestees enjoy
"diminished privacy interests," the Court determined that the digital data
contained within arrestees' cell phones may not be searched absent
probable cause and a warrant.
According to Riley, the significant
privacy interests at stake in the modern cell phone's digital contents are
more than enough to offset the otherwise reduced privacy interests of
arrestees. This same rationale can arguably be applied to K-12 and
college students, who have likewise enjoyed diminished privacy rights.
Finally, the Court rejected the Government's proposed rule that
would restrict the scope of a warrantless cell phone search to the
particular areas of the phone where information relevant to the crime of
arrest, the arrestee's identity, or officer safety might be discovered. 89
The Government , argued that this proposed rule would prevent
rummaging for evidence of unrelated crimes. 90 Under its proposal, the
Government explained, police would be empowered to search a phone's
contacts list, call logs, text messages, and e-mails when doing so would
enable police to determine the suspect's identity or information regarding
the offense of arrest, as in the case of an arrested drug trafficker.91 The

because a phone contains not only "many sensitive records previously found in the
home," but also "a broad array of private information never found in a home in any
form .. ").
88. See id. at 2488, 2493.
89. See id. at 2492.
90. See Brief for Petitioner at 51, United States v. Wurie, 134 U.S. 999 (2014) (No.
13-212), 2014 WL 828012.
91. Id. at 52-53.
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Court rejected this approach, however, because of its potential to uncover
private information having nothing to do with the Chimel justifications of
officer safety and evidence destruction. The Court further noted that, as
a practical matter, "officers would not always be able to discern in
92
advance what information would be found where."
This final aspect of Riley is significant because, despite endorsing a
nearly identical framework in the K-12 cases, where educators are
permitted to conduct warrantless searches that are "reasonable in scope"
in light of the evidence of unlawful activity or rules violations known to
them at the time, 93 the Court was reluctant to adopt a similar rule here.
In other words, although the Government's proposed scope limitations fit
comfortably with the underlying search incident to arrest justifications,
the rule it proposed proved unworkable because of the potential to
uncover extraneous private information unconnected to the legitimate
objectives recognized in the search incident to arrest cases. This ruling
reflects the Court's larger concern that it is extremely difficult for an
officer (or educator) to limit the scope of a cell phone search to avoid
uncovering protected information. As such, the ruling suggests that if
warrantless cell phone searches are to be permitted in the K-12 and
college contexts, they must occur under strict scope limitations.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIED TO K-12 STUDENTS
A.

K-12 Students' Reduced Expectations ofPrivacy

For decades, the Supreme Court has recognized that K-12 students'
are different in public schools than
"Fourth Amendment rights . .
94 Historically, K-12 educators have stood in loco parentis
elsewhere."
9
with certain parental powers over their schoolchildren. ' Thus, while at
school, just as at home, minor children are "subject, even as to their
96
More
physical freedom, to the control of their [educator] guardians."
have
systems
school
public
that
recognized
has
Court
the
recently,
carrying
in
leeway
certain
require
that
unique custodial responsibilities
out their responsibilities "as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to
[their] care."97 These unique custodial and tutelary responsibilities
92. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
93. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
94. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995).
95. See id. at 655 (discussing the common law origins of this power).
96. Id.
97. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002). See also id at 830 (recognizing that "[a] student's privacy
interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for
maintaining discipline, health, and safety.").
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"permit[] a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised
over free adults," 98 including "enforcement of rules against conduct that
would be perfectly'permissible if undertaken by an adult." 99 As Fourth
Amendment law has developed in the K-12 setting, the need to permit
flexibility in supervision and control of K-12 students has translated into
relaxed search and seizure rules. 100
1.

New Jersey v. TL.O.

Any discussion of the Fourth Amendment as it pertains to public
school K-12 students must include New Jersey v. TL.O.,' 0 which set
forth today's standard for assessing the legality of searches by public
school officials.1 02
In T.L.O., a public high school teacher discovered two girls
smoking in a restroom, one of whom was fourteen-year-old freshman,
T.L.O. Because smoking in a restroom violated a school rule, the teacher
took the girls to speak with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick.
When T.L.O. denied the smoking allegations, and even claimed she did
not smoke at all, Choplick opened her purse and discovered cigarettes.
As Choplick reached into the purse to retrieve the cigarettes, he also
discovered cigarette rolling papers, which he associated with marijuana.
This discovery prompted him to search the purse even more thoroughly.
After a more extensive search, Choplick discovered marijuana, a pipe,
empty plastic bags, a large number of one-dollar bills, an apparent list of
students who owed T.L.O. money, and letters that implicated T.L.O. in
marijuana dealing.1 0 3 Thereafter, T.L.O. confessed to police that she had
been selling marijuana.1 04 Based on the evidence seized from T.L.O.'s
purse and her confession, the State brought delinquency charges against
T.L.O., who then moved to suppress the evidence seized from her purse
and her confession, on the grounds that the search of her purse was
unlawful.'0o
The New Jersey state courts divided on the legality of the purse
search, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
98.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
99. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
100. See M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing that
"teachers have a unique relationship to their students, both in administering discipline as
part of their educational function, and in protecting the well-being of all children in their
care and custody," which in turn "justify greater flexibility when applying the Fourth
Amendment in a school setting").
101. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
102. See id. at 328.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 328-29.
105. Id. at 329.
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Applying the Fourth Amendment's
consider the issue. 106
the need to search against the
"balance[s]
which
"reasonableness" test,
invasion which the search entails," the Court examined the "individual's
legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security" vis-d-vis "the
government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public
order." 107 On one side of the scale, the Court considered a child's
expectations of privacy in articles of personal property brought into
public schools and, on this issue, rejected the State's argument that
school children have "virtually no legitimate expectation of privacy" in
such articles.108 Rather, the Court found that "schoolchildren may find it
necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband
items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily
waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto
school grounds." 109 On the other side of the scale, the Court considered
"the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds," which, in the Court's
view, "requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary
procedures." 10
In considering how to "strike the balance between the schoolchild's
legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate
need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place,"" the
Court noted that "the school setting requires some easing of the
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily
subject,"ll most notably, the warrant requirement. According to the
is unsuited to the school
Court, "[t]he warrant requirement . .
environment" because "requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before
searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the
criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift
1 13
and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."
106. See id. at 330-32 (describing its decision to hear the case not only to resolve the
legality of the search at issue, but also to determine whether the exclusionary rule is the
appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful school searches). Before
addressing the legality of the search, the Court had to first determine "whether [the
Fourth] Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to
searches conducted by public school officials." The Court held that it does, for the
simple reason that public school officials, just as law enforcement officers, are state
agents and thus subject to the limits on .state action imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 333-37.
107. Id. at 337.
108. Id. at 338.
109. Id. at 339.
110. See id. at 339-40.
111. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
112. Id. at 340.
113. Id
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After dispensing with the warrant requirement, the Court considered
whether "some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity"
was appropriate for public school searches-specifically, whether a level
of suspicion less demanding than probable cause would suffice.1 14 Citing
the "substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
maintain order in the schools,"'1" along with the need to permit educators
"to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and
common sense" as opposed to "the niceties of probable cause,"1 16 the
Court determined that probable cause was indeed not required."' Rather,
the Court declared, "the legality of the search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search." 18
In what has become the reasonableness test courts employ in this
area, the Court then set forth a twofold inquiry for determining the
reasonableness of a search in this particular context, considering: (1)
whether the action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the
search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference.' 19 Regarding the first
requirement, the Court declared that a search of a student by a teacher or
other school official will, "[u]nder ordinary circumstances," be justified
at its inception "when there are reasonablegrounds for suspecting"-in
other words, reasonable suspicion 120-"that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
rules of the school."121 Regarding the second requirement, the Court
stated that "such a search will be permissible in its scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction."1 2 2

114.

See id at 340-41.

115. See id at 341.
116. See id. at 343.
117. See id. at 341.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id at 345 (adopting the "reasonable suspicion" standard); see also Safford
United Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (affirming that TL.O. "applied a
standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator's
search of a student"). In comparing probable cause with the lesser reasonable suspicion
requirement, the Safford Court summarized "the required knowledge component of
probable cause" as "rais[ing] a 'fair probability' or a 'substantial chance' of discovering
evidence of criminal activity," and described "[tihe lesser standard for school searches"
as "a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing." See Safford, 557 U.S. at 371.
121. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
122. See id
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Safford UnitedSchool Districtv. Redding

Although the T.L.O. Court ultimately upheld the search of T.L.O.'s
purse as reasonable in its inception and reasonable in scope, 123 nearly 25
years later in Safford United School District v. Redding,l 24 the Court
struck down a strip search of a similar school child based on suspicion
that she was supplying prescription medicines to schoolchildren for
recreational consumption. Most importantly, the Court suggested in this
decision that more intrusive searches of schoolchildren require greater
scrutiny, possibly including higher levels of suspicion.1 2 5
In Safford, school officials received information that students were
bringing prescription medication to school for recreational use, which, if
true, would have violated school policy. 126 One student, who was caught
possessing pills, informed school officials that she had obtained the pills
7
Savana later
from thirteen-year-old classmate, Savana Redding.1 2
which
backpack,
of
her
a
search
to
consented
and
allegations
denied the
12 8
the
and
a
teacher
point,
that
At
produced no evidence of wrongdoing.
school nurse asked Savana to remove her jacket, socks, shoes, pants, and
t-shirt, so they could continue the search for pills. 129 Finally, Savana was
told to pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the
elastic on her underpants, which exposed her breasts and pelvic area to
1
inspection. 13 0 No pills were found during any of the searches.1 3
Thereafter, Savana's mother filed suit against the School District
32
in
and various school officials for conducting an illegal "strip search"
individual
The
rights.
Amendment
violation of Savana's Fourth
defendants moved for summary judgment, which the District Court
granted due to no Fourth Amendment violation.133 The Supreme Court
later granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the search of
134
Savana's backpack, outer clothing, underwear, and bra.

123.
124.

See id. at 343-47.
Safford United Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009).

125.

See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.

126. See Safford, 577 U.S. at 371-72.
127. Id. at 372.
128. Id. at 368.
129. Id. at 369.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. See id. at 374. In describing the search that occurred in this case, the Court
stated that "[t]he exact label for this ... intrusion is not important, though strip search is a
fair way to speak of it." Id.
133. See id. at 369. This ruling came in the context of the defendants' qualified
immunity defense. See id (describing the rulings of the lower courts).
134. See id. at 370.
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The Court first determined that both the search of Savana's
backpack and of her outer clothing were reasonable and justified by a
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, which was based, in part, on the
other student's identification of Savana as the source of pills found at the
school. 135 Regarding the backpack and outer clothing search, the Court
declared:
If a student is reasonably suspected of giving out contraband pills,
she is reasonably suspected of carrying them on her person and in
[her backpack] .

. .

. If [a] reasonable suspicion of pill distribution

were not understood to support searches of outer clothes and
backpack[s], it would not justify any search worth making. 36
The search of Savana's underwear and bra, however, was a different
matter. According to the Court, this search, which "exposed [Savana's]
breasts and pelvic area to some degree," is "categorically distinct" from
the backpack and outer clothing search, thus "requiring distinct elements
of justification on the part of school authorities."l37 On this issue, the
Court found that "the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree
of intrusion."l38 Here, the Court emphasized that school officials had no
factual basis for believing that Savana was actually hiding pills in her
underwear, and "general background possibilities" of students hiding
pills in such places were otherwise insufficient.1 39 The Court further
noted that the pills themselves were relatively innocuous-common pain
relievers equivalent to two Advil-and school officials did not suspect
that individual students were receiving a large quantity of pills. 14 0 Thus,
"the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search
reasonable."1 4 1
Ultimately, it is unclear whether the Safford Court would have
upheld the strip search at issue based on a mere reasonable suspicion to
believe Savana had been concealing pills in her undergarments, had there
been facts directly supporting that possibility, or whether the Court
would have required a heightened level of suspicion, such as probable
cause. 142 The Court concluded, for example, by clarifying that "the

135. See id. at 372-74.
136. Safford, 557 U.S. at 373-74.
137. See id. at 374.
138. See id. at 375.
139. See id. at 376.
140. See id. at 375-76.
141. Id at 377.
142. See generally Martin R. Gardner, Strip Searching Students: The Supreme
Court's Latest Failure to Articulate A "Sufficiently Clear" Statement of Fourth
Amendment Law, 80 Miss. L.J. 955 (2011) (discussing the uncertainties created by the
Court's decision in Safford, and recognizing that in cases involving reasonable suspicion
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T.L.O. concern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the
support of reasonablesuspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for
hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the
quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate
parts." 1 4 3 The Court thereby implied that if the school officials had a
mere reason to believe that Savana was truly hiding pills in her
underwear, as opposed to probable cause, then the search of her
undergarments would have been reasonable.144 Yet, in the very next
sentence, the Court placed that specific type of search "in a category of
its own,"' 4 5 and had earlier noted that some communities have deemed
such searches "never reasonable" due to their particularly degrading
nature and have entirely banned such searches "no matter what the facts
may be." 1 46 Thus, it seems safe to say that the Safford Court ratified, and
at a minimum recognized, that more intrusive searches are subject to
greater constitutional scrutiny, even in the K-12 setting where school
officials are given wide leeway to conduct searches. This particular view
has been endorsed by lower courts 4 7 and is a principle that may
that a student has hidden evidence under her clothing, a strip search could still be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
143. See Safford, 557 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
144. See id. at 370 (recognizing that the TL.O. Court "applied a standard of
reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator's search of a
student."); see also id. at 371 (comparing probable cause with the lesser reasonable
suspicion requirement, and describing "[t]he lesser standard for school searches" as "a
moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing."). Cf Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 343 (2009) (extending the right to search a vehicle incident to arrest when it is
"reasonable to'believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle").
145. See Safford, 557 U.S. at 377.
146. See id at 375. Cf Hearring v. Sliwowski, 872 F. Supp. 2d 647, 670-73 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012), rev'd in part, 712 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2013) (discussing relevant school strip
search cases and concluding, in the context of analyzing a qualified immunity defense,
that "the fundamental dignity of a young person's body is so obvious and [cases decided]
since 1984 provide more than fair warnings to school officials that such intrusive
searches of students cannot be made by school officials without justification").
147. See, e.g., Cornfield by Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d
1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing the issue and concluding that "as the intrusiveness
of the search of a student intensifies, so too does the standard of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness." Thus, "[w]hat may constitute reasonable suspicion for a search of a
locker or even a pocket or pocketbook may fall well short of reasonableness for a nude
search."); Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' observation in Cornfield by Lewis that "as the
intrusiveness of the search of a student intensifies, so too does the standard of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness."); M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) ("We
are . . of the view that as the intrusiveness of the search intensifies, the standard of
Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness' approaches probable cause, even in the school
context. Thus, when a teacher conducts a highly intrusive invasion such as the strip
search in this case, it is reasonable to require that probable cause be present."). But see
Doe v. Champaign Cmty. Unit 4 Sch. Dist., No. 11-3355, 2015 WL 3464076, at *5, *6
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influence future searches of K-12 student cell phones in light of Riley's
pronouncements regarding the extreme intrusiveness of such searches.
B.

K-12 Student Cell Phone Searches: Pre-Riley CaseLaw

As noted, TL.O. requires a school official's search of a K-12
student to be both reasonable in its inception, typically requiring
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, as well as reasonable in scope,
requiring measures "reasonably related to the objectives of the search
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction."1 4 8 Prior to the Riley decision, courts
applied the T.L.O. requirements to a number of cases involving K-12
student cell phone searches.
1.

Reasonable at its Inception

TL.O. first requires a student cell phone search to be reasonable in
its inception. 14 9 Two recent cases involving this requirement as applied
to K-12 student cell phone searches are particularly noteworthy: J. W v.
Desoto County School District,150 which upheld the search of a student's
cell phone based on a suspected violation of school policy; and G.C. v.
Owensboro Public Schools,' which reached the opposite result on
similar facts.
J. W involved a seventh-grade student in Mississippi, R.W., who
was expelled for using his cell phone on school grounds. At the time, the
school's Discipline Rule 2-6 prohibited students from possessing or
using a cell phone in school. 15 2 Nevertheless, R.W. opened his phone
while in class to retrieve a text message. Upon observing R.W. using his
cell phone, his teacher, Stephen Stafford, asked R.W. for the device.

(C.D. Ill. May 29, 2015) (interpreting Safford as requiring reasonable suspicion to
conduct a strip search, or some "specific reason 'to suppose that [D.M.] was carrying
[marijuana] in [the waistband of his] underwear,"' rather than probable cause);
Cummerlander v. Patriot Preparatory Acad. Inc., 86 F. Supp. 3d 808, 819 (S.D. Ohio
2015) (discussing the reasonable suspicion requirement of TL.O. and Saffordas requiring
"a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing," and one that turns on the
"specificity of the information received" and the "reliability of its source," among other
context-specific factors) (quoting Safford, 577 U.S. at 371).
148. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
149. See id
150.

See generally J.W. v. Desoto Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-cv-00155-MPM-DAS,

2010 WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010).
151. See generally G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013).
152. See J. W, 2010 WL 4394059, at *4 ("Desoto County School District's Rule 2-6
lists the '[p]ossession of electronic equipment/device (beepers, telephone, etc.) without
prior approval of the administration' as a Level II offense, with a maximum punishment
of three days suspension.").
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R.W. then closed the phone and handed it to Stafford, who opened the
phone and reviewed its stored photographs. One of the photos showed
another middle-school student holding a B.B. gun. R.W. was then taken
to the office of the principal, Kenneth Walker, who also examined the
phone's contents. After reviewing the photographs, Walker and local
Police Sergeant Nicholas Kennedy "accused R.W. of having gang
R.W.'s
pictures," for which he was immediately suspended.'
suspension later became an expulsion after a hearing at which Walker
testified that he perceived R.W. as "a threat to school safety."154 R.W.'s
mother then filed suit, alleging that the search of R.W.'s phone violated
the Fourth Amendment.
The court focused its analysis on the individual defendants in the
case, consisting mostly of school officials, who presented a qualified
immunity defense"'s that required R.W. to prove they violated "clearly
established rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' 5 6
Applying this standard, the court found that not only is there no "clearly
established" United States Supreme Court case law establishing that the
search of R.W.'s phone was unlawful, "that law is actually quite
favorable to the individual defendants" given the Supreme Court's
deviation from the probable cause requirement in T.L.O. and
endorsement of a more lenient reasonableness test. 57
In analyzing the defendants' actions, the court found it "crucial"
that R.W. was caught using his cell phone at school, while the school
rule at issue prohibited only the mere possession of such devices on
school grounds.'1 8 Regarding the decision to search the phone once
seized, the court reasoned:
Upon witnessing a student improperly using a cell phone at school, it
strikes this court as being reasonable for a school official to seek to
determine to what end the student was improperly using that phone.
For example, it may well be the case that the student was engaged in
some form of cheating, such as by viewing information improperly
stored in the cell phone. It is also true that a student using his cell
phone at school may reasonably be suspected of communicating with
another student who would also be subject to disciplinary action for
improper cell phone usage.159

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See id. at *1.
See id. at *2.
See id. at *3.
See id. (citation omitted).
See id. at *4.
See id.
Id.
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For these reasons, the court found that the search of R.W.'s cell
phone, including its photographs, was justified in its inception and
reasonable in scope even though the defendants had no suspicion of
wrongdoing other than the use of the phone to retrieve a text message. 160
In contrast to J W, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, in G.C., struck down a similar cell phone search for lack of
evidence to suspect the phone contained incriminating information.1 6 1
The student at issue, G.C., had a history of disciplinary problems
throughout high school. 162 During his freshman year, G.C. informed
school officials that he suffered from anger and depression. On two
occasions, once in the fall of 2007 and again in the fall of 2008, G.C.
even indicated that he was considering taking his life. 163
In September 2009, a teacher observed G.C. texting in class, which
violated the school's cell phone policy. 164 G.C.'s teacher confiscated the
phone and brought it to the assistant principal, Melissa Brown, who then
read four text messages on the device.1 65 According to Brown, she read
the text messages "to see if there was an issue with which I could help
him so that he would not do something harmful to himself or someone
else." 66 Brown explained that she had these worries because she "was
aware of previous angry outbursts from [G.C.] and that [he] had admitted
to drug use in the past.",1 67 Brown also noted that she knew G.C. "drove
a fast car and had once talked about suicide," adding that she "was
concerned how [he] would further react to his phone being taken away
and that he might hurt himself or someone else." 68
G.C. later filed suit for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendment rights.1 69 Thereafter, the District Court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all of G.C.'s federal

160. See id Regarding whether the search of the phone was reasonable in scope, the
Mississippi district court distinguished the case from a similar cell phone search case,
Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2006), and declared
that "the decision by the school officials in this case to merely look at the photos on
R.W.'s cell phone was far more limited, and far more justified, than that taken by the
school officials in Klump," such that the search at issue in R.W.'s case was "not contrary
to clearly established law." See id at *5.
161. G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 632 (6th Cir. 2013) (involving an
issue of first impression for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on "how the TL.O. [test]
applies to the search of a student's cell phone").
162. See id. at 626-27.
163. See id at 627.
164. See id. at 628.
165. See id.
166. Id
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id G.C. also brought claims under the Kentucky Constitution. See id.

RETHINKING STUDENT CELL PHONE SEARCHES

2016]

335

170
claims, which G.C. appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

After reviewing the TL.O. standards and relevant case law, including

J. W, the court cautioned that not all infractions involving cell phones
will involve "reasonable suspicion that a search will uncover evidence of
further wrongdoing or of injury to the student or another,"" adding that
"using a cell phone on school grounds does not automatically trigger an
essentially unlimited right enabling a school official to search any
content stored on the phone that is not related either substantively or
temporally to the infraction." 172
Turning to the search of G.C.'s phone, the court considered whether
school officials had reasonable grounds to suspect that a search of G.C.'s
phone would reveal evidence of improper activity in light of defendants'
argument that G.C.'s documented drug abuse and suicidal thoughts
justified the search. 173 Rejecting defendants' argument, the court found

that "general background knowledge of drug abuse or depressive
tendencies, without more," does not allow a school official to search a
student's cell phone. 174
Highlighting the lack of evidence that G.C. was engaging in
unlawful activity at the time of the search, or that he was contemplating
injuring himself at that time, the court declared:
G.C. was sitting in class when his teacher caught him sending two
text messages on his phone. When his phone was confiscated ...
G.C. became upset. The defendants have failed to demonstrate how
anything in this sequence of events indicated to them that a search of
the phone would reveal evidence of criminal activity, impending

contravention of additional school rules, or potential harm to anyone
in the school. On these facts, the defendants did.175 not have a
reasonable suspicion to justify the search at its inception.

Absent evidence to suggest that G.C. was using his phone to
effectuate additional rules violations, such as accessing ,the internet to
look up test answers, the G.C. court was unwilling to allow school
officials to fish for evidence of anything that might incriminate G.C.
G. C and J W are difficult to reconcile. The students in each case
were observed using their cell phones in class to send or receive text
messages; yet, one court authorized a warrantless search of the phone's
contents, including its photographs, whereas the other court found no

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
See G.C, 711 F.3d at 632-33.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 633-34.
Id
Id. at 634.
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basis to search the phone at all. Unlike the J W court, which found it
reasonable for a school official to search a phone's contents to determine
"to what end [a] student [is] improperly using [his] phone," and upheld a
search of the phone's photographs even where officials had no basis for
suspecting the student was accessing photos at the time,176 the G.C. court
interpreted the first TL.O. requirement more stringently, requiring more
than "general background knowledge" suggesting possible prohibited
uses of the phone.177 As such, the G.C. court found the phone search
unreasonable at its inception, where the J W court found a similar search
reasonable in all respects.
Although the cases are difficult to reconcile, J W involved the
qualified immunity defense, which required the plaintiff to produce
"clearly established" United States Supreme Court case law in his
favor.178 Since the Supreme Court has not decided a case involving a
search of a K-12 student's phone, this was a difficult standard for J.W. to
meet. Moreover, the defendants' stated reason for searching the phone in
G.C. was not persuasive, as it involved nothing in the student's present
circumstances that would have given rise to a genuine suspicion to
believe the phone contained incriminating information at that time.
Rather, according to the school official who searched G.C.'s phone, she
read G.C.'s texts "to see if there was an issue with which I could help
him so that he would not do something harmful to himself or someone
else." 1 79 This explanation does not fit comfortably with the TL.O.
requirement of a present factual basis for suspecting a search will
produce evidence that the student has violated or is violating a school
rule or the law.180 Regardless, it remains the case that TL.O.'s first
requirement mandates some factual basis to suspect a cell phone's
contents may include incriminating evidence before it may be searched.
Moreover, the precise evidence needed to create "reasonable suspicion"
may vary, depending on the circumstances at issue. 181

176. See J.W. v. Desoto Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-cv-00155-MPM-DAS, 2010 WL
4394059, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010).
177. G.C., 711 F.3d at 633-34.
178. J. W., 2010 WL 4394059, at *3.
179. G.C., 711 F.3d at 628.
180. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
181. Perhaps the best articulation of the reasonable suspicion standard occurred in
Terry v. Ohio, which declared that a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity requires
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts," would make an officer suspicious of criminal activity. See 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
Reasonable suspicion is less demanding than probable cause, see Safford United Sch.
Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009), but requires more than an "inarticulate
hunch," Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
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Reasonable in Scope

Along with being reasonable in its inception, TL.O. requires a
student cell phone search to be reasonably related in scope to the
182 One case
circumstances that justified the search in the first place.
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
183
Pennsylvania, Klump v. Nazareth Area School District, exemplifies
how school officials can violate the Fourth Amendment when they do
not properly limit the scope of a cell phone search.
In Klump, plaintiff Christopher Klump's high school had a policy
that permitted students to carry, but not use or display, cell phones during
school hours. 184 According to the complaint's allegations, which the
court accepted as true in resolving the defendant's motion to dismiss,
Christopher's cell phone fell out of his pocket while in school and came
185
The
to rest on his leg, prompting his teacher to confiscate the device.
other
nine
to.call
phone
the
teacher and an assistant principal then used
students listed in Christopher's contacts list to determine whether they
186
The school officials also
too were violating the cell phone policy.
voice mail, and had a
and
messages
text
accessed Christopher's
while pretending to be
brother,
conversation with Christopher's younger
18 7
Christopher, by using the cell phone's instant messaging feature.
Feeling aggrieved, Christopher and his parents filed suit against the
school district, superintendent, assistant principal, and teacher alleging
that Christopher's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his
teacher and assistant principal accessed his phone number directory,
voice mail, and text messages, and used the phone to call other
students. 188 In response, defendants argued that the Klumps could not
establish a Fourth Amendment violation because the search was justified
in its inception and was reasonable in scope.
Rejecting the defendants' argument, the court found that, although
seizing the phone was permissible given that Christopher had violated the
school's policy prohibiting use or display of cell phones during school
hours, school officials violated the Fourth Amendment by using the
phone to call other students in order to generate evidence of other
students' misconduct. 190 To initiate such a search, T.L.O. requires
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 627, 630.
Id. at 628-29.
See id. at 639.
See id. at 640.
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"reasonable grounds for believing that the search will turn up evidence
that the student [i.e., Christopher Klump] has violated or is violating
either the law or the rules of the school."l 91 Based on the facts alleged in
the complaint, however, officials had no reason to suspect that a search
of Christopher's phone would produce evidence that Christopher himself
was violating another school policy; rather, they simply hoped to use the
phone to entice other students' violations. 19 2 Accordingly, the court
found no basis for initiating a search.1 93
Although the Klump court's analysis focused on the reasonableness
of the phone's search at its inception, the case nicely illustrates a cell
phone search that went too far. Even if the Klump court had followed the
reasoning of J. W and found it reasonable to search Christopher's phone,
in a more limited manner, to determine to what end Christopher was
improperly using the phone (for example, whether he was using the
phone to cheat on a test), the extensive search in Klump would have
clearly exceeded the scope of any such authorized search. 194 Thus, the
case is a vivid example of the type of search TL. 0. does not permit.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIED TO COLLEGE STUDENTS

Unlike the K-12 context, where the law is generally straightforward
in regards to the basic T.L.O. requirements and their application in the
typical K-12 search case, the law is more complex in the college campus
setting, primarily for two reasons. First, the actions of certain officials
are sometimes beyond Fourth Amendment restrictions by virtue of the
fact that purely private action, no matter how unreasonable, is not subject
to constitutional constraints. 9 s Second, many college officials do not
191. See id. at 640 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985))
(emphasis added).
192. See id. at 640.
193. See Klump,425 F. Supp.2dat640-41.
194. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
195. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)
(recognizing that "[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or
seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative, the
Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or
agent of the Government"); Commonwealth v. Bair, No. 11-P-1381, 2012 Mass. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 894, at *6 (Mass. App. Ct. July 7, 2012) (recognizing that "[t]here is no
'search and seizure' in the constitutional sense where 'evidence is seized
by private
parties who are not acting as agents of the police and subsequently turned over to the
police"). For essentially this same reason, purely private action cannot form the basis for
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.
See, e.g.,
English v. Univ. of Tulsa, No. 14-CV-0284-CVE-FHM, 2015 WL 4623942, at *1, *4-5
(N.D. Okla. Aug. 3, 2015) (dismissing plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim when campus
security officers of the University of Tulsa, a private university, entered plaintiff's
apartment without consent because the alleged Fourth Amendment violation was not
committed by a person "acting under color of state law," noting specifically that
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typically engage in criminal investigations. Thus, even where there is
state action, criminal evidence on a college campus is often inadvertently
discovered while carrying out an administrative function, such as a
routine health and safety inspection of a dorm room, which is usually a
"reasonable" administrative search under the Fourth Amendment. In
considering whether searching a college student's cell phone falls outside
the Fourth Amendment's protective umbrella, it is therefore necessary to
consider these two variables, and, most importantly, whether they apply
in the typical college student cell phone search case.
A.

State Action Requirement

A threshold issue in Fourth Amendment analysis is whether its
protections apply at all, which depends, in part, on whether the allegedly
unlawful action involved state action. Whether a private person should
be deemed an agent of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes
19 6
is determined by the totality of the circumstances.

Most courts

applying this test consider two primary factors: (1) "whether the
government [directed] . . . or acquiesced in, the intrusive conduct"; and

(2) "whether the party performing the search intended to assist law
19 7
Under this test, as
enforcement efforts or to further his own ends."
government involvement in the search increases, the private searcher's
intent becomes less important.1 98 Thus, obvious cases of state action
include, for example, those where a local police officer requests a private
university official to conduct a search of a suspect's dorm room and turn
199
Where such government
over any criminal evidence obtained.
involvement is absent, as is typical in most college searches, the test
essentially focuses on the primary purpose of the inspection.
In the college campus setting, inspections are usually intended to
advance some administrative purpose, such as ensuring safety in dorm
"[p]rivate universities are considered private parties" under § 1983 and First Circuit case
law).
196. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614-15.
197. See Bryan R. Lemons, Public Education and Student Privacy: Application of
the Fourth Amendment to Dormitoriesat Public Colleges and Universities, 2012 B.Y.U.
EDUC. &L.J. 31, 43 (2012).
198. Id. at 43.
199. See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1971) (striking
down a dorm room search of certain Troy State students conducted by both local law
enforcement officers and university officials, at the request and direction of the local
police, and recognizing that a university regulation permitting administrative inspections
of dorm rooms "cannot be construed or applied so as to give consent to a search for
evidence for the primary purpose of a criminal prosecution"). See also State v. Keadle,
277 S.E.2d 456, 459 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing that "where a search is conducted
by a private citizen, but only at the government's initiation and under their guidance, it is
not a private search but becomes a search by the sovereign").
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rooms, or to uncover evidence of a crime, such as drug dealing by a
student. Given the obligation of colleges to provide a safe learning
environment, searches conducted for administrative purposes are
permissible, whereas those conducted for criminal investigative purposes
are not. Translated into Fourth Amendment principles, cases thus hold
that campus personnel who conduct inspections may or may not be state
actors, regardless of whether they are on a public or private university
campus, depending on the purpose of their inspection.200
Searches of dorm rooms conducted by resident assistants provide
the most vivid example of the typical state action analysis. Take, for
example, a case involving a resident assistant at a public university who
discovers a stolen stereo in a student's dorm room while conducting
standard maintenance inspections of the lighting in all rooms. The
resident assistant seizes the stolen stereo, leaves the room, and delivers
the stereo to police, who then use the stereo to initiate a theft
prosecution. When the student later attempts to suppress the stolen
stereo in his subsequent theft prosecution, he will almost certainly fail.
This is true even though the inspection occurred on a public university
campus and despite the fact that the resident assistant was carrying out
his official duties as a public university representative at the time.201
Because the primary purpose of the inspection was administrative in
nature, rather than to secure evidence of a crime, courts will find there is
no state action and the Fourth Amendment does not apply.202 As a result,
there is no need to analyze the reasonableness of any alleged Fourth
Amendment action.

200. See, e.g., Medlock v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., No. 1:11-CV-00977-TWP-DKL,
2011 WL 4068453 (S.D.-Ind. Sept. 13, 2011). The Medlock court concluded that routine
health and safety inspection by Indiana University resident assistants did not constitute
state action because although "the actions of the Resident Specialist in conducting the
health and safety inspection serve [Indiana University] at large, . . . they are not tainted
with the degree of government authority that will implicate the Fourth Amendment. Both
[resident assistants] were fulfilling their obligations as resident specialists when they
happened to observe a tube of marijuana and a marijuana plant in Medlock's room. Their
inspection of Medlock's room was not at the behest of the police, but in accordance with
[the university's] health and safety regulations." Id. at *4.
201. This illustration is based on State v. Keadle, 277 S.E.2d 456 (N.C. Ct. App.
1981), which, on similar facts, held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply because
the purpose of the inspection was not to secure evidence to be used in a criminal
conviction. See id. at 460.
202. See id at 459-60 (reasoning that the research assistant was "motivated by
reasons independent of a desire to secure evidence to be used in a criminal conviction,"
such that excluding the evidence in the student's subsequent criminal prosecution would
serve no meaningful deterrent function, making "the [F]ourth [A]mendment and the
exclusionary rule inapplicable").
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Reasonableness Requirement

As it turns out, courts have often conflated the Fourth Amendment's
state action requirement, which is a threshold issue impacting the
applicability of the Amendment, and its "reasonableness" requirement,
which applies only when deciding whether an actual Fourth Amendment
action-a search or seizure-was unlawful. Nevertheless, determining
whether the Fourth Amendment applies under either line of inquiry
usually turns on the same variable: the primary purpose of the
inspection. Regardless of whether the analysis focuses on state action or
reasonableness, an inspection with a primary purpose of uncovering
criminal evidence typically triggers the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement, whereas one whose primary purpose is administrative, such
as a routine dorm room inspection for campus safety purposes, does
not.

203

One recent case involving a private university, Commonwealth v.
204
demonstrates how either line of inquiry can lead to the same
Carr,
result on the ultimate issue of whether a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred. Most importantly, the case further illustrates how additional
searches beyond an initial administrative inspection that are designed to
uncover evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution (such as a cell
phone search) must be justified by their own independent suspicion, and
203. The distinction turns on whether the inspection is a reasonable exercise of the
college's supervisory duty and obligation to maintain an effective learning environment.
As one court explained:
The college does not stand, strictly speaking, in loco parentis to its students,
nor is their relationship purely contractual in the traditional sense. The
relationship grows out of the peculiar ... interests of college and student. A
student naturally has the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizures ...
. The college, on the other hand, has an "affirmative obligation" to promulgate
and enforce reasonable regulations designed to protect campus order and
discipline and to promote an environment consistent with the educational
process. The validity of the regulation authorizing search of dormitories thus
does not depend on whether a student "waives" his right to Fourth Amendment
protection or on whether he has "contracted" it away; rather, its validity is
determined by whether the regulation is a reasonable exercise of the college's
supervisory duty. In other words, if the regulation-or, in the absence of a
regulation, the action of the college authorities-is necessary in aid of the basic
responsibility of the institution regarding discipline and maintenance of an
"educational atmosphere," then it will be presumed facially reasonable despite
the fact that it may infringe to some extent on the outer bounds of the Fourth
Amendment rights of students.
State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 1033, 1035-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Moore v. Student
Affairs Commonwealth of Troy State Univ., 284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968)).
204. Commonwealth v. Carr, 918 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009), rev'd on other
grounds, 936 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. 2010).
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must otherwise fully comply with Fourth Amendment restrictions
pertaining to ordinary criminal investigations.
Carr involved a dorm room search that occurred at Boston College,
a private university.
Under Boston College's "Conditions for
Residency," all weapons of any kind, whether licensed or unlicensed and
whether real or counterfeit, are prohibited.205 After receiving reports that
student Daniel Carr had a gun and a knife in his dorm room, resident
assistant April Wynn brought the reporting students to campus police,
where they repeated the allegations to Sergeant John Derick.206
Thereafter, Sergeant Derick, two additional campus police officers,
Wynn, and another resident director went to Carr's dorm room and
knocked on the door.20 7 When Carr opened the door, Derick entered the
room and explained to Carr that he was responding to a report of
weapons in the room. 2 0 8
After Derick secured a waiver of Carr's Miranda rights, Carr
showed Derick where he had hidden a plastic replica gun that resembled
a .45 caliber handgun, which was missing the red tip normally present on
such guns. 20 9 After Carr produced the gun, Derick asked if there were
any more weapons in the room, and Carr's roommate produced a folding
buck knife.210 Campus police also discovered other similar weapons.2 11
All of these items violated the college's Conditions of Residency,
although none appeared to be unlawful.2 12
After finding the reported weapons, the investigating officers sought
consent to conduct a more extensive search of the dorm room, and
produced a written form including both a "Miranda waiver" and a
"Consent to Search."
After initial resistance, both Carr and his
roommate signed the "Consent to Search" form. During the ensuing
search, officers discovered illegal drugs, and arrested Carr and his
roommate.213
On appeal, the court had to decide three issues: (1) whether the
Fourth Amendment's state action requirement was met, thereby
triggering Fourth Amendment protections; (2) if so, whether the officers'
initial entry into the dorm room was valid; and, finally, (3) whether the
roommate's consent, which was the basis for conducting the more
extensive dorm room search, was likewise valid.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id. at 849.
Id at 848-49.
Id. at 849.
Id
Id. at 849-50.
Id at 850.
Id.
See id at 848-50.
See id. at 848-51.
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As to the state action question, the court first noted that the resident
assistants would not have been engaged in state action had they entered
the dorm room on their own initiative to make a "plain view search" for
prohibited items (i.e., as part of an administrative inspection), as "Boston
College is a private actor not subject to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment . . . .
The constitutional analysis potentially changed,
however, when the resident assistants "enlist[ed] the assistance of the
campus police," 215 who can be state actors by virtue of the fact that they
are "[s]pecially commissioned officers formally affiliated with the
sovereign and possessing authority beyond that of an ordinary citizen . .
such as arrest and use of weapons ....
Next, the court considered whether the officers' initial entry into the
dorm room was lawful. Emphasizing the campus safety concerns that
motivated this particular search, the court found that "the initial entry . .
to investigate a credible report of a weapon in the room was authorized
under the college's 'Conditions of Residency' and did not require a
search warrant or consent." 2 17 Thus, despite having found that the
campus police could be governmental actors, the court found that,
because the primary purpose of the initial entry "was not in furtherance
of a criminal investigative function, but to address a violation of Boston
College's policy that prohibited weapons in the dormitory," the initial
entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment.2 18
The final issue in the case involved whether the officers obtained
valid consent to search the dorm room more extensively, which occurred
after the reported weapons that prompted the initial search (a gun and
knife) had been located and secured.2 1 9 According to the court, this
particular search, which resulted in the discovery of illegal drugs, "stands
on different footing" than the initial entry presumably because the safety
concerns that justified the initial search for weapons no longer applied.220
For this reason, the court ended its analysis by examining the validity of
214. See Carr, 918 N.E.2d at 851-52.
215. See id. at 852.
216. See id. Nevertheless, the court declared that "while the Fourth Amendment ...
appl[ies] to the conduct of Boston College's campus police, in this circumstance the
officers' private function affects the constitutionality of their conduct and renders it
reasonable." See id.
217. Id. at 851.
218. Id at 852-53. Emphasizing the university's legitimate campus safety concern,
the court found that "[t]he investigation was a legitimate means of protecting the
college's property and fulfilling its obligation to provide a safe environment for its
residents." Id. at 853. Further recognizing the lack of police instigation as a critical
factor, the court emphasized that "[t]he resident director enlisted police assistance, not
vice versa." Id.
219. Id. at 853.
220. See id. at 854.
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the purported consent, a warrant exception that allegedly authorized the
additional search. 22 1 Although determining the purported consent's
validity was necessary to resolve whether the drugs should be
suppressed, the court's analysis of that particular issue is not relevant
here. Rather, what matters is the court's recognition of the fact that, once
the campus safety concerns had evaporated, the validity of the additional
search conducted for a criminal investigative purpose required its own,
independent justification.
V.

K-12 AND COLLEGE STUDENT CELL PHONE SEARCHES AFTER RILEY

Riley involved a search conducted on the heels of an arrest, which is
far removed from the K-12 and college campus setting where searches
often occur because of simple rules violations or for routine
administrative purposes. Nevertheless, the analogy between searches of
adult arrestees and searches of students is strong, as both sets of
individuals enjoy limited privacy rights.
Moreover, despite
acknowledging that arrestees enjoy "diminished privacy interests," Riley
found that the "privacy-related concerns" in cell phones' digital data
were so substantial that searching such data required a warrant.222 This
same rationale can be applied to K-12 and college students. Quite
simply, if "privacy-related concerns are weighty enough" 223 to require a
warrant to search the cell phones of arrestees, who have traditionally
enjoyed reduced Fourth Amendment protection, then privacy-related
concerns may also be weighty enough to conduct the same searches of
K-12 and college students, who likewise enjoy reduced Fourth
Amendment protection.
Through its lengthy analysis of the privacy concerns inherent in cell
phones, Riley left no doubt that cell phones occupy a unique position in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and may deserve even greater
constitutional protection than what is owed the home. According to
Riley, "[a] phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records
previously found in the home," such as bank statements, "it also contains
a broad array of private information never found in a home in any
form... ," such as an Internet search and browsing history or a
collection of apps that reveal a person's hobbies and interests.2 24 Cell
phones, Riley declared, are like "minicomputers" 225 capable of being
used for many purposes, such as text and voice communications.226
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 854-55.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488-89 (2014).
Id.
See id. at 2490-91.
Id. at 2489.
See id.
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Moreover, the storage capacity of modem smart phones is massive and,
by analogy to physical searches, is like housing a vast warehouse of
information.227 Thus, by searching a cell phone, it is possible to
aggregate many discrete pieces of private information to essentially
reconstruct a person's entire private life.228
The privacy concerns in the modem cell phone do not change
simply because the phone is used by K-12 and college students as
opposed to adults. First, the underlying digital data is the same. In
addition, given the extensive use of cell phones by young persons, the
volume of data on a young person's phone is likely just as great, if not
greater, than that of the typical adult. Thus, the privacy concerns are at a
minimum no different, and possibly even weightier. For this reason,
even searches of cell phones conducted on public school groundswhere Fourth Amendment protections are typically diminished-may
demand enhanced Fourth Amendment protection. Nevertheless, upon
considering the underlying reasons for permitting warrantless searches of
K-12 and college students, the case for extending Riley to K-12 students
becomes problematic.
A.

K-12 Students

In K-12 case law, reasonable suspicion is typically required for a
search to be reasonable, and judicial oversight generally does not
occur. 229 Accordingly, the question in the K-12 context is simple:
whether Riley should be interpreted to require more than reasonable
suspicion, and perhaps some type of third-party approval, for an educator
to search a child's cell phone.
As noted, the Supreme Court has rejected both the probable cause
and warrant requirements for the K-12 context.230 In doing so, the T.L.O.
Court emphasized the "substantial need of teachers and administrators
for freedom to maintain order in the schools," 231 as well as the desire to
avoid having them master the subtleties of probable cause,232 determining
instead that teachers should be permitted to act swiftly "according to the
dictates of reason and common sense."233 Although these concerns are
equally valid in the context of cell phone searches, particularly given the
potential for cell phones to disrupt the learning process, the privacy
227.
22 8.
229.
warrant
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Id.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985) (rejecting both the
and probable cause requirements for K-12 searches).
See id
See id. at 341.
See id.
See id.
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concerns on the other side of the scale are far greater than in T.L.O.,
which involved the less invasive search of a student's purse.234 That the
enhanced privacy concerns in the modern cell phone vis-i-vis a student's
personal belongings should alter the reasonableness balancing cannot be
questioned. Indeed, on several occasions, Riley compared the privacy
interests in bags, purses, and the like and found them far less substantial
than those associated with the modern cell phone.235 The only question,
therefore, is whether the cell phone's increased privacy concerns disrupt
the reasonableness balance so much as to alter the constitutional
requirements for searching a student's phone.
The argument against extending Riley to the K-12 setting is
straightforward. First, as the T.L.O. Court acknowledged, the warrant
requirement is particularly unsuited to the K-12 school environment,
where "swift and informal disciplinary procedures" are required.236
Second, Riley involved a search incident to an adult's lawful arrest for an
offense having nothing to do with his cell phone. These circumstances
are different than the typical K-12 cell phone search case, where cell
phones are ordinarily searched as the result of a phone being used by a
young child to effectuate a suspected violation of school policy. Third,
warrant exception precedents ordinarily do not apply to other warrant
exception scenarios. In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, where context
matters, narrow holdings should be applied narrowly. 237 Finally, there
are few, if any, cases to date applying Riley to the search of a K-12
student's cell phone, and at least one court has rejected the argument
outright (although the decision could be overturned on appeal).238
234. See id. at 328.
235. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488-89 (2014) ("The United States
asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is 'materially indistinguishable'
from searches of these sorts of physical items. That is like saying a ride on horseback is
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from
point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together. Modem cell phones, as
a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a
cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.") (internal citations omitted); id. at 2490 ("[I]t is no
exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell
phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives-from the
mundane to the intimate. Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine
basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two in the
occasional case.") (internal citations omitted).
236. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
237. See id at 337 ("Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is
always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place.").
238. The California Court of Appeal recently rejected the suggestion of applying
Riley to the search of a high school student's cell phone in In re Rafael C, 245 Cal. App.
4th 1288, 1297-1300 (2016). However, this opinion was subsequently superseded and
will be reviewed by the California Supreme Court. See In re R.C, 372 P.3d 903 (Cal.
2016) (granting petition for review).
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Having also considered Riley's impact on K-12 student cell phone
searches, Professor Bernard James argues that the T.L.O. framework is
alone sufficient to produce the additional rigor needed for such
searches.23 9 Professor James points to the Court's application of the
T.L.O. framework in Safford, which involved a strip search, and argues
that "[o]ne must logically conclude that the higher-order privacy interest
of students to resist a strip search is equal to (if not greater than) the
higher expectation of privacy students now possess in the digital contents
of their cell phones." 24 0 According to Professor James, if the T.L.O.
framework can guard against an unreasonable strip search, it can
likewise guard against an unreasonable cell phone search. Regarding
warrants, Professor James further argues that T.L.O. is designed to
"permanently separate educators from other government officials to
whom the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement would apply,"
particularly given schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for
children. 24 1 As such, he believes that Riley should not alter K-12 cell
phone search requirements, warrants should not be required, and the
TL.O. reasonableness framework should continue to govern such
searches.24 2
Although I agree with Professor James that the unique custodial and
tutelary responsibilities of K-12 educators, combined with their need for
freedom from judicial interference, makes the warrant requirement
particularly ill-suited in the K-12 setting, I believe there is a middleground solution that would properly balance these governmental interests
To strike the
against the unique privacy interests in cell phones.
system of
internal
an
adopt
necessary balance, I propose that schools
checks and balances that consists of two stages. Under the first stage of
my proposal, the school official seeking to search a phone must first
state, in writing, the detailed factual basis for suspecting the phone
contains evidence of a violation of law or school rule. Thereafter, an
.independent school administrator, perhaps the head principal or a school
board member, would review the report and, if a sufficient basis for
searching the phone exists, would approve the search by affixing his or
her signature to the document. This would be akin to an administrative
warrant that a head school official must sign before a cell phone may be
239.

See James, supra note 4, at 353.

240. See id. at 354.
241. See id. at 352.
242. Despite arguing that Riley should not alter the T.L.O. reasonableness
framework, Professor James acknowledges that "smart devices combine with digital
storage technology to create a unique type of personal property" that carries with it
"increased rigor of constitutional protections," such that refusing to modify T.L. 0. in this
context "negates the unique privacy interest of students who take cell phones onto
campus." See id at 351.
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searched. Also, as in Riley, the phone could be seized for whatever
reasonable amount of time is needed to secure the necessary
authorization.
Although not all scholars agree on the true purpose of the Fourth
Amendment,243 at least one supposed purpose is to capture the benefits of
separation of powers by requiring independent judicial review and
244
approval before the executive may invade one's privacy.
However,
formal judicial approval may do more harm than good in the public
school setting. My proposal would obtain the benefits of such review
without incurring its costs.
On the one hand, by requiring a second-tier review within the
school itself, my proposal would allow schools to develop their own
internal set of checks and balances, thereby respecting TL.O.'s concern
with preserving "the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed
in [public] schools," 245 free from undue judicial supervision. On the
other hand, my proposal would help ensure that when cell phones are
searched, they are examined in a reasonable manner with minimal impact
on privacy.
Effectuating TL.O.'s reasonable in its inception
requirement, my proposal would require the school official desiring to
search a phone to detail the precise factual basis for suspecting the phone
will contain evidence that the student has violated or is violating a school
rule or the law.246
Implementing TL.O.'s reasonable in scope
requirement, my proposal would also require the initiating school official
to include in his or her written report a search protocol specifying exactly
243. See Tracey Maclin & Julia Mirabella, Framing the Fourth, 109 MICH. L. REv.
1049, 1052 (2011) (reporting that the comprehensive Fourth Amendment research of
William Cuddihy, who generated the most comprehensive and detailed analysis of the
history of search and seizure law, "demonstrates that there was no single meaning of the
Fourth Amendment").
244. See Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should
Leave FourthAmendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REv. 895, 941 (2002) (arguing
that "[a]lthough the [Fourth] Amendment's text bans only general warrants, the 'larger
purpose for which the Framers adopted the text [was] to curb the exercise of discretionary
authority by officers"'); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981) (stating that
"[t]he central objectionable feature of both [the general warrants that had occurred in
England and of the writs of assistance used in the Colonies] was that they provided no
judicial check on the determination of the executing officials that the evidence available
justified an intrusion into any particular home"). But see Amar, supra note 25, at 771-72
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment contains no actual warrant requirement, and that "at
times, the Founders viewed judges and certain judicial proceedings with suspicion,"
adding that the Amendment's Warrant Clause "does not require, presuppose, or even
encourage warrants-it limits them" by imposing strict standards on their issuance);
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547,
591-619 (1999) (rejecting Amar's reasonableness view of the Fourth Amendment as
"based in large measure on erroneous historical premises").
245. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
246. See id. at 342.
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which parts of the phone will be searched. If a school official has reason
to believe a student is violating school rules by sending text messages,
for example, only the text message function of the phone may be
searched. Likewise, if a school official has reason to suspect a student
has been using his or her phone to take photos while in school, only the
phone's photographs may be examined. In this manner, my proposal
will ensure that cell phone searches, when they occur, are not
unnecessarily intrusive. Finally, my proposal would require only
relevant head school administrators-those who are engaged in the
proposed second-tier review-to receive training on the necessary scope
of search limitations, such as, for example, the Sixth Circuit's warning in
G.C. that "using a cell phone on school grounds does not automatically
trigger an essentially unlimited right ... to search any content stored on
the phone that is not related either substantively or temporally to the
infraction." 24 7 This, in turn, will spare the vast majority of school
officials (such as the teachers who are most likely to observe a cell phone
violation) from having to master the relevant legal requirements and case
precedents.248
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Riley, and even

before Riley in the context of laptop searches, some courts have required
detailed search protocols, which are technical documents that explain the
actual search methods the government will use to search a cell phone, to
ensure that cell phone searches are not unnecessarily intrusive. 24 9 Such
protocols are designed to prevent general exploratory searches of phones
for whatever incriminating evidence may be found.250 Some search
protocols go even further than the usual particularity requirements, which
require mere descriptions of the places to be searched and evidence to be
seized, by requiring a description of the precise methods the government
will use to find the data on the seized device.251

247. G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 633 (6th Cir. 2013).
248. See TL.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
249. For an excellent summary of this practice, see generally William Clark,
Protecting the Privacies of Digital Life: Riley v. California, the Fourth Amendment's
ParticularityRequirement, and Search Protocols for Cell Phone Search Warrants, 56
B.C. L. REv. 1981 (2015).
250. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement "ensures that [a] search will be carefully tailored
to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory
searches the Framers intended to prohibit"); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272
(10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the purpose of the particularity requirement is "to
prevent a general exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings").
251. See In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 166-68 (D.D.C. 2014)
(requiring a detailed search protocol before authorizing the search of an iPhone); see also
Clark, supra note 249, at 1990-91 (discussing this issue).
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In light of the special concerns inherent in the K-12 school setting,
my proposal does not require a description of the actual methods school
officials will employ when searching a phone. Rather, it merely requires
a basic search protocol limiting cell phone searches to certain types of
data, such as text or image files. 2 52 Such basic scope requirements are, in
my view, sufficient to ensure that cell phone searches are "not
excessively intrusive in light of the . . . nature of the infraction,"2 53
thereby preventing the type of search struck down in Klump.254
B.

College Students

Although college students are treated similarly to K-12 students at
times, particularly with respect to administrative inspections of college
living quarters, the campus safety concerns that underlie those rulings
typically do not apply to a cell phone's digital contents. Quite simply, a
phone's digital data, unlike a weapon that may be hidden in a student's
dorm room, cannot harm anyone. 255 Moreover, unlike administrative
sweeps of dorm rooms for health and safety purposes, it is difficult to
imagine a scenario where college students' cell phones could be
reasonably "inspected" for similar administrative purposes. Thus,
routinely searching such devices would not enhance the educational
environment. Finally, even when a university official happens to come
across a cell phone while conducting an otherwise permissible
administrative inspection, which is unlikely given that most students tend
to carry their phones with them, 25 6 it is difficult to imagine circumstances
that would permit an immediate inspection of the phone's digital data.
Take, for example, the hypothetical scenario of Sam, a student who
lives in a university owned and operated dorm room at Indiana
University, a public university.
When Sam enrolled at Indiana
University, he signed a form consenting to the provisions of the Indiana

252. Cf In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957-59 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (finding that when issuing a warrant authorizing the seizure and search of a
computer, a judge may require the government to set forth a search protocol that attempts
to confine the search to only those areas where there is probable cause to believe
evidence might be found, which may include "limit[ations] by date range; doing key
word searches; limiting the search to text files or graphics files; and focusing on [only
select] software programs").
253. See James, supra note 4, at 342.
254. See supra notes 184-194 and accompanying text.
255. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (addressing this issue and
basing its holding, in part, on the fact that "[d]igital data stored on a cell phone ... can
endanger no one").
256. See id. at 2490 (reporting that, "[a]ccording to one recent poll, nearly threequarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the
time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower").
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University Student Handbook, which authorizes certain administrative
health and safety inspections of campus dorm rooms. After receiving
reports of an unauthorized cat on the fifth floor of Sam's dorm room,
resident assistant Jimmy randomly inspects various rooms near where the
cat sounds were heard. When Jimmy enters Sam's dorm room, he
notices a strange light emanating from Sam's closet and thinks he smells
cat litter. Jimmy then opens the closet door and discovers dozens of
plastic bags full of marijuana. He also observes what appears to be a
customer list on a pad of paper lying next to the plastic bags, which lists
names and amounts of "money owed," along with a cell phone.
In this particular context, one might argue that the phone's contents
should be immediately searchable without a warrant, at least the portions
of the phone that might contain evidence related to drug distribution.
25 7
it is one thing for the resident
However, as Carr demonstrates,
assistant to inadvertently discover evidence of a crime while carrying out
a permissible administrative inspection, such as the marijuana lying in
plain view in Sam's closet, and quite another to expand the search's
criminal investigation having nothing to do with
scope into a full-blown
258
the missing cat.
There are also inherent difficulties in limiting the scope of a cell
phone search in an appropriate manner. For this reason, Riley rejected
the Government's proposal that would have allowed warrantless searches
of only the particular areas of a phone that might contain evidence
related to drug distribution.259 In its Supreme Court brief in Riley, the
Government argued that a warrantless search "would be objectively

257.

See supra notes 205-221 and accompanying text.

258. This hypothetical is adapted from Commonwealth v. Neilson, 666 N.E.2d 984
(Mass. App. Ct. 1996), and Medlock v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 1:11-CV-00977-TWP,
2011 WL 4068453 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2011). The first issue in a case such as this would
be whether the resident assistant's initial entry into the dorm room was permissible. On
these facts, it likely was. Colleges and universities have a duty to insure the safety of
their students, who reside in residence halls around campus, and conducting health and
safety inspections of dorm rooms helps achieve this goal. Here, the resident assistant
entered Sam's dorm room for the sole purpose of administering a health and safety
inspection in accordance with reasonable university regulations. Thus, the resident
assistant was likely justified in entering the dorm room and discovering the evidence
lying in plain view. See Neilson, 666 N.E.2d at 987 (upholding resident assistant's initial
a
entry of dorm room on similar facts because the initial entry was "intended to enforce
legitimate health and safety rule that related to the college's function as an educational
institution," but striking down a subsequent, more extensive search of the room by
campus police when the purpose shifted to a search for evidence of crime); Medlock,
2011 WL 4068453, at *5 (finding a resident assistant's initial entry of a student's dorm
room, where he discovered drugs in plain view, not to violate the Fourth Amendment
when performed for the purpose of administering a health and safety inspection in
accordance with school regulations).
259. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
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reasonable if an officer has reason to believe the phone contains evidence
of the offense of arrest." 26 0 The Government further argued that "[t]he
scope of that search would depend on the nature of the offense." 26 1 The
Government suggested that drug traffickers, for example, could
"reasonably be expected to have evidence related to their transactions
stored in the areas of the phone concerned with its communication
functions-the'call log, contacts list, text messages, and emails," such
that a search of these particular areas would be reasonable.26 2 Riley
rejected this argument, however, because even limited rights to search a
phone's contents "would impose few meaningful constraints on officers"
and be practically unworkable.263 As other courts have noted, digital
data is often so "intermingled" within a device that only the tightest
limitations on scope will suffice to prevent a general exploratory
rummaging of whatever evidence the phone might contain.264
In short, as Chimel, Belton, Gant, and Riley collectively establish,
warrants may be dispensed with only when the justifications for the
particular warrant exception at issue apply. 2 6 5 In the context of college
student cell phones, the underlying campus safety concern that justifies
many warrantless searches on college campuses (or any other legitimate
administrative objective) simply does not apply. Although litigants have
argued that the lesser protections afforded K-12 students should be
expanded to the college setting,266 the vast majority of college students
are adults, over the age of 18, such that the unique educational aspects of
K-12 education do not apply. Accordingly, it is far more likely that the
Court would impose strict probable cause and warrant requirements,
similar to Riley, to searches of college students' cell phones.

260. See Brief for the United States at 53, United States v. Wurie, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014) (No. 13-212), 2014 WL 828012.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
264. See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957-58 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
265. See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473-95; Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332
(2009); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
266. See Commonwealth v. Neilson, 666 N.E.2d 984, 986 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)
(noting the argument and stating that "[a]lthough the courts that have examined the issue
are split on whether the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause and a warrant in
college searches, when police are involved and the evidence obtained is to be used in a
criminal proceeding, courts generally require probable cause and a warrant, absent
express consent or exigent circumstances").
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VI. CONCLUSION

This article has considered the analogy between cell phone searches
of arrestees and similar searches of K-12 and college students. As with
ordinary adults, college students have a general right to privacy, whereas
colleges have an obligation to provide a safe campus and effective
learning environment. In traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, the
probable cause requirement strikes a balance between these competing
interests and is the practical safeguard that prevents arbitrary intrusion by
the government. However, on the college campus, neither probable
cause nor warrants are required to conduct administrative inspections,
particularly those designed to ensure a safe and effective learning
environment, which are ordinarily reasonable given their non-criminal
focus. As argued above, there are very few, if any, imaginable scenarios
where the search of a college student's cell phone would fit comfortably
within this rationale. Moreover, as adults, college students deserve the
same protections in their cell phones enjoyed by the adult arrestees in
Riley: the full protection of a warrant and probable cause.
The case for K-12 students is different. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court has declared that the warrant and probable cause
requirements are not well suited to the K-12 context. On the other hand,
Riley's extensive discussion of the unique privacy concerns associated
with the modern cell phone cannot be ignored. Thus, it is less clear how
to properly strike the balance between school officials' legitimate needs
to maintain order and discipline in the K-12 context and school
children's legitimate expectations of privacy in their cell phones. The
proposal set forth in this article recognizes the unique needs of K-12
school officials without unduly interposing the judiciary in their
educational pursuits, while simultaneously affording the greater
protection in school children's cell phones Riley demands.

